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Is there a logic that governs the unsayable? In this chapter, I will propose 
and defend a single, fixed, definite answer to this question. Additionally, 
I will argue that there can be no other answer than this so long as one 
chooses to view the many and varied attempts to talk about the inef-
fable as exercises that are both coherent and also in some way convey-
ers of meaning. As a point of entry into this debate, I will focus on 
William Franke’s A Philosophy of the Unsayable1 and the single claim I 
shall defend as the answer to the question posed in my title, is: “Yes, and 
no. Or yes-but-not-yes. And/or yes-no.”
While it might seem to the uninitiated as if I am merely playing with 
words, I am quite serious in making three assertions. First, this answer 
is definite and singular (though it admittedly consists of at least three 
distinct parts). Second, it is the only possible answer one can state to 
the question as posed. And third, my answer to the question does not 
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preclude the option of giving no answer whatsoever—i.e., of remaining 
silent. For, as clarified by the subtitle, the question makes no assump-
tions about whether or not one must talk about the ineffable in order to 
understand it. Wittgensteinean silence in the face of the ineffable may 
well be not only possible but perhaps even superior to writing articles 
and books about the unsayable that claim to convey something mean-
ingful about it. Be that as it may, my concern in this essay is to identify 
the basic principles that make it possible to talk (or write) meaningfully 
about what cannot be said.
What must be stated as clearly as possible, therefore, right at the 
outset of any inquiry such as this one, is that the subject-matter we are 
discussing is linguistic, due to the undeniable fact that we are talking 
about it, even though what we are talking about is contra-linguistic. That 
is, the subject matter of the unsayable is, by definition, the realm of 
human experience that defies explanation in human language; it is the 
set of experiences that, try as we might, we cannot adequately express 
in words. So the question I am posing here can be most concretely 
expressed as follows: when we nevertheless talk about that unsayable 
realm of human experience, does our form of discourse take on a set of 
characteristics that can be reduced to a logical form? Once again, my 
single definite answer to this question is: “Yes, and no. Or yes-but-not-
yes. And/or yes-no.”
Funny though this answer may seem, I can seriously affirm that it is 
not intended as a joke—or at least, not primarily so. That we may find 
the single definite answer to our question to be somewhat humorous, 
however, does have implications for the entire project that Franke and 
so many others who attempt to write about that which cannot be said 
have undertaken. I will return to these implications at the end of this 
chapter.
If we take seriously the (admittedly humorous) fact that my question 
is about the logic of any attempt to say what cannot be said, then the 
easiest way to approach an assessment of my alleged answer—i.e., that 
the logic that governs any attempt to say what cannot be said is precisely 
“Yes, and no; or yes-but-not-yes; and/or yes-no”—will be to consider 
first the standard, time-honored answer to the related question: What 
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is the logic of any attempt to say what can be said? For that question, 
the most obvious place to turn is to classical (Aristotelian) logic.
One need not go further than the most basic Introduction to Logic 
textbook to learn that the most fundamental basis for human linguistic 
communication rests on the interrelationship between three basic logi-
cal laws, often called the law of identity, the law of contradiction, and 
the law of the excluded middle. (Following fairly standard philosophical 
practice, I shall refer to the second of these as the law of noncontradic-
tion, for reasons that will soon become clear. For now, let it suffice to 
say that the proper name for this law should reflect what the law accom-
plishes: it shows us how not to contradict ourselves.) Reducing the three 
laws to their most basic logical form, we can express them as: “A = A” 
(i.e., a thing is what it is); “−(A ^ −A)” (i.e., a thing and its negation 
cannot both pertain at the same time and in the same respect); and 
“A v -A” (i.e., something either is or is not).2
In order to understand the claim I am making about the logic of any 
attempt to talk about the ineffable, I must make one crucial adjustment 
to the standard Aristotelian laws. Whereas Aristotle portrayed his three 
laws as universal, covering all coherent, meaningful uses of language 
whatsoever, I claim that his laws properly apply only to one of the two 
main ways that human beings have of using language—namely, to talk 
about what can be said (i.e., to use words literally, to refer to knowable 
phenomena). To signify that Aristotle’s three laws do not apply to all 
language whatsoever but only to the way of using language that keeps 
itself within these strict limits, I will refer to them as the laws of analytic 
logic. Anytime we use language in an attempt to analyze the constitu-
ent parts of what can be parsed, these three laws determine the formal 
requirements for how our language derives its meaning; indeed, they 
must be followed by anyone who wants their words to be taken as liter-
ally true and self-consistent.3
The twofold claim that is the basis of this essay—that the ineffable 
has a logic and that its logical form can be understood by regarding 
“Yes, and no; or yes-but-not-yes; and/or yes-no” as a definite answer to 
the question of the existence of such a logic—similarly applies only to 
one realm of human discourse. I will refer to the logic of that realm as 
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synthetic logic. With this in mind, let us now proceed to examine each of 
the component parts of my answer to the question at hand.
Is there a logic of the ineffable? The first part of my three-in-one 
answer is: “Yes, and no”. The “yes” component of this part of the answer 
will be justified if it turns out that the answer I am now in the process 
of explaining does correctly describe the logic of the ineffable. However, 
even if I succeed in offering a persuasive explanation, the answer will 
also be “no”, because, as will soon become apparent, if it is not already 
all-too-blatantly so, what this logic governs is not the ineffable as such, 
but any attempt to talk coherently about the ineffable. As Franke so pow-
erfully adumbrates in his book, the unsayable is by definition something 
that cannot be said, so when we talk about it, we are not, in fact, talk-
ing about it in any literal sense; rather, we are, at best, evoking a form of 
experience, an experience that is what it is even though, insofar as it is 
ineffable, it can never be put into words.
To avoid equivocation, it seems that we must regard this “yes, and 
no” part of our answer as referring either to the ineffable itself or to our 
attempts to talk about the ineffable. Or do we? Intentionally answering 
the question in an equivocal way (“yes, and no”) has evoked an insight 
that is crucial to a proper understanding of the logic of the ineffable: 
the only way (or, at least, one very good way) to justify any attempt to 
talk about something that, in itself, cannot be talked about is to do so 
with the aim of evoking a new insight; and the resulting insight (if it is 
a genuine insight) must participate in the realm of the unsayable even 
though it is expressed in words. That is, the reference to language that 
is inherent in the “yes” component of the first answer is required, if the 
result of our investigation is to produce an actual logic of the ineffable 
(for if it is not about language, then it is not a logic!), yet the exclusion 
of language that is inherent in the “no” component of the first answer 
is also required, if the result of our investigation is to be about the inef-
fable, and not merely about a playful but meaningless form of words. To 
put this point more succinctly: this first part of our three-in-one answer 
entails that the logic of the ineffable must intentionally equivocate, and 
must do so for the purpose of evoking an insight.
Importantly, this first part of my threefold answer, the “yes, and no”, 
exhibits a form that is precisely the opposite of Aristotle’s second law of 
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analytic logic. Whereas we must take great pains to ensure, when talking 
about the sayable, that when we say “A” we do not mean “−A” (for to 
mean both would be to contradict ourselves), when we talk about the 
unsayable, we must take equal care to ensure that when we say “A” we 
do also mean “−A”. For if we only mean “A” when we say “A”, then we 
are talking literally about the sayable, not symbolically, about the unsay-
able! The first law of synthetic logic, therefore, must be understood as 
diametrically opposed to the Aristotelian law of (non )contrdication. 
This first law can quite determinately be called the law of contradiction: 
in synthetic logic, we must affirm “A ^ −A”, which we can do only if 
somehow “A = −A” is true (cf. note 2). In my initial statement of the 
logic of the ineffable I expressed this, perhaps somewhat cryptically (but 
therefore, all the more accurately, as far as synthetic logic is concerned) as 
“yes, and no”.
At this point let me make an important clarification. Aristotle is very 
explicit in arguing that the basic laws of analytic logic assume that the 
components being related by each law must be regarded as being true at 
the same time and in the same respect. In other words, if we can demon-
strate that an apparent contradiction is based on an equivocation, then 
we can account for the truth of the proposition without ever genuinely 
straying from the laws of analytic logic. In the foregoing example, there 
is no need to appeal to synthetic logic if we know in advance that the 
“yes” side of the first answer refers to a linguistic structure while the 
“no” side does not. A paradox is only paradoxical for as long as we are 
unable to translate what seems at first to be a case of synthetic logic into 
a case of analytic logic. That is, a paradox is resolved if the contradic-
tion proves not to be a contradiction after all, but rather to be an unno-
ticed equivocation based on a conflation of perspectives; and a paradox 
becomes an out-and-out contradiction (and must therefore be declared 
to be false) if its initial status as “apparent” turns out to be absolute. In 
other words, the first law of synthetic logic (the law of contradiction) 
issues a challenge: if you want to evoke an insight into the ineffable, 
then appear to contradict yourself.
But this first law comes with a dual warning: do not actually con-
tradict yourself, or your attempt to evoke the ineffable may have disas-
trous consequences; and if the insight evoked by your paradoxical words 
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can be translated into analytic logic without remainder, then (noble and 
well-meaning though your words may be) you have not actually evoked 
the ineffable but have merely played with words. Synthetic logic is a 
logic of the ineffable only insofar as it guides us to create linguistic for-
mulations that are so rich in meaning that they will never be able to 
be translated into analytic logic without remainder. That is, a genuine 
use of synthetic logic is one that continues to evoke new and unfore-
seen insights, even if some of the insights it evokes may be translatable 
into analytic terms. As for the remainder, we can experience it only in 
silence.
The second part of my answer, “or yes-but-not-yes” is, as should now 
be readily apparent, the negation of Aristotle’s first law. Just as Aristotle’s 
law of identity ensures that if we are talking about what is sayable then 
we must always mean “A” when we say “A”, this second law of synthetic 
logic requires us not to mean “A” when we utter “A” in an attempt to 
convey a coherent and meaningful truth about the unsayable. I there-
fore call this second law of synthetic logic the law of non-identity, or 
A ≠ A. The definite answer I posed at the outset of this talk expresses 
this law as “yes-but-not-yes”.
A key problem in unpacking the implications of this second law of 
synthetic logic is to determine whether it, together with the analytic law 
that corresponds to it, specifies an ontological principle (namely, that a 
thing is—or is not—what it is) or a merely linguistic principle (namely, 
that a given word must refer—or must not refer—to the same thing 
wherever it appears in the sentence). The latter is surely the minimum 
that Aristotle’s law requires, though he also applied it ontologically, to 
argue that when we say that a thing has a feature (named “A”), we mean 
that the thing in question actually expresses the ontological reality (the 
A) to which that word refers. The corresponding law of synthetic logic, 
therefore, should entail that, when using words in an attempt to evoke 
an experience of the ineffable, we must not assume that a thing is the 
thing it appears to be, nor should we assume that a word we use to refer 
to a feature of that thing necessarily refers to that feature.
Franke’s instructive work on the unsayable contains examples of 
expressions that illustrate one or both of these two laws of synthetic 
logic on nearly every page, but one example of each will suffice for 
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our purposes here. First, he points out that in A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream Shakespeare’s Bottom “says over and over again…what cannot 
be said.”4 This claim can only be properly understood by a reader who 
recognizes that Franke is intentionally equivocating, in order to evoke 
insight in the reader. Likewise, he later states that “the One…cannot 
even be said unequivocally to be One.”5 Again, this claim can convey 
its intended meaning accurately and successfully only if we (the readers) 
take the words to indicate that the author is intentionally identifying 
the unidentifiable. One who reads such statements solely with Aristotle’s 
laws of identity and non-contradiction in mind is bound to be befud-
dled and therefore blocked from experiencing any deep truth that may 
be revealed in these seemingly contradictory words. By contrast, if we 
interpret the first quote as an expression of the law of contradiction 
(i.e., as referring to the fact that Bottom’s words frequently refer to an 
A that is also not A, and serve the purpose of evoking an insight about 
the ineffable) and the second quote as an expression of the law of non-
identity (i.e., that when we say “One” in our talk about the ineffable, 
we often refer to what at the same time “is not One”), then the path to 
insight is flung wide open. While narrow-minded adherents of strictly 
analytic logic might scoff at the meaninglessness of such explicitly para-
doxical expressions, anyone with an openness to the meaningfulness of 
synthetic logic will treat such statements as challenges to experience the 
ineffable so that relevant insights may emerge.
What role, then, is played by the third part of my answer, “And/or 
yes-no”? This statement negates Aristotle’s law of the excluded middle, 
affirming instead that when we talk about the ineffable, we are compelled 
to assume what I call the law of the included middle. This law ensures 
that, between any two opposite terms, a space always exists for a mid-
dle term that is neither A nor −A on its own; it may be either both at 
once (as the law of contradiction already permits) or neither (as implied 
by the law of non-identity). That is, we are no longer required to affirm 
“Av-A”, as the law of the excluded middle would suggest, because we are 
now somehow affirming both sides of the equation in one unified whole. 
This, of course, amounts to saying that the thing we are talking about 
is an utter mystery according to our normal linguistic and conceptual 
frameworks. And that is precisely what is affirmed, over and over, by all 
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those who use words meaningfully to talk about the unsayable. This, I 
take it, is the gist of Franke’s critique of Hegel: even though his dialecti-
cal logic bore a striking resemblance to the first two laws of synthetic 
logic, Hegel refused to admit that the Absolute of which he spoke is not 
the ultimately Rational (and thus knowable), but is ultimately mysteri-
ous. Indeed, if we can affirm it at all (using words), Hegel’s Absolute 
Spirit would have to be regarded as the ultimate linguistic experience of 
Mystery.
Incidentally, the conjunctions used in my initial answer are also quite 
specific. When talking about the sayable, we must always take care to 
abide by all three of Aristotle’s laws of analytic logic. Those who talk 
about the unsayable, by contrast, may select just one of two main paths, 
typically called the “way of affirmation” and the “way of negation”—
though writers who choose one of these paths almost always also choose 
the other at some point, taking the two quite distinct approaches to be 
complementary. The first employs analogical thinking to affirm that 
some A is equal to something that is quite distinct from and perhaps 
even opposite to A; that is, the way of affirmation entails describing 
the ineffable by means of linguistic constructions that are ultimately 
grounded on the law of contradiction (“A and not-A are both the 
case”) in order to impose symbolic meanings onto things or experi-
ences that would otherwise be quite ordinary and literally describable. 
For example, God may be called a “father” even though saying this does 
not mean that God literally is a father. The way of negation, by con-
trast, employs more literal, quasi-analytical thinking to deny that any 
A is actually A—a clear application of the law of non-identity. Thus, 
God’s existence, when understood according to the way of negation, 
is not a form of existence that requires us to affirm that God (literally) 
“exists”. Recognizing the reciprocity between the two laws of synthetic 
logic helps us to understand why, in the apophatic tradition, the ways of 
affirmation and negation are nearly always seen as complementary, even 
though they use words in quite different and seemingly incompatible 
ways.
Technically, these time-honored “ways” are logically distinct (hence 
my use of “or” between the first and second parts of my threefold 
stevepq@hkbu.edu.hk
6 Is There a Logic of the Ineffable? Or, How Is it Possible to …     79
answer); one who wishes to talk about the unsayable must choose one 
or the other at any given time. Yet, paradoxically, what one ends up say-
ing in each case can also be portrayed as the same—namely, as a “yes-no” 
paradox that is both affirmation and negation at the same time. This, of 
course, cannot be the case according to the analytic logic that applies 
to what can be said. Yet, when we are talking synthetically and sym-
bolically about what cannot be said, it most literally is the case. That is, 
even though the ways of affirmation and negation must be kept quite 
distinct from each other when talking about the unsayable, they both 
equally depend on inclusive thinking. As such, the mystery of inclu-
sion can work together with both affirmation and negation, or with 
just one of the two, in order to generate meaningful talk about the inef-
fable. Indeed, writers often do this when they appeal to mystery in a 
statement that (other than the appeal) employs analytic logic to make 
a statement about the unsayable. Thus, for example, Kant repeatedly 
states that the thing in itself is unknowable (cf. the way of negation), yet 
elsewhere feels free to affirm that the form of causality that is appropri-
ate to it is not spatio-temporal but an analogical causality of freedom (cf. 
the way of affirmation).
Let me summarize my central claim as clearly as possible. Ironic 
though it may seem, a clear grasp of the logical basis for our use of 
words is just as important when talking about the unsayable as it is when 
talking about the sayable. Once we realize that the former is merely 
the negation of the latter—that the fixed laws of synthetic logic can be 
readily defined, simply by stating the opposites of the laws of analytic 
logic—the clarity and forcefulness of our talk about the unsayable can 
be enhanced.
In conclusion, I suggest that the universality of humor among lan-
guage users is arguably the best evidence that talk about the unsay-
able has a logic. For, as I have argued elsewhere, the logic of humor is 
also grounded on the same laws of synthetic logic that govern our talk 
about the unsayable.6 This, I maintain, is why anyone who is open to 
the transcendent is bound to find talk about the unsayable as incredibly 
funny, yet without in the least disrespecting its profound meaningful-
ness in the process.
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Notes
1. William Franke, A Philosophy of the Unsayable (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2014).
2. Although this is the standard way of expressing the law of noncontra-
diction in the literature, I normally express it using the simpler (but 
technically less precise) formula, “A ≠ −A”. For my previous defense of 
synthetic logic, together with an explanation of why I prefer the sim-
pler version of the formula, see Chaps. 4 and 5 of my book, The Tree of 
Philosophy: A course of introductory lectures for beginning students of phi-
losophy (Hong Kong: Philopsychy Press, 2000 [1992]).
3. As we shall see, the qualifier “literally” is crucial here. My statement 
about the laws of analytic logic is by no means meant to exclude the 
possibility of paraconsistent logics, such as the fine work Graham Priest 
has done on dialetheism. (See, for example, G. Priest, R. Routley, 
and J. Norman (eds.), Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent 
[München: Philosophia Verlag, 1989].) Quite to the contrary, my pur-
pose in labeling Aristotelian logic as analytic is precisely to make room 
for an opposing type of logic that governs the inconsistent.
4. Franke, A Philosophy of the Unsayable, pp. 13–14.
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Ⲵ䘭ሻ (No More Hanging Around—The Quest for Truth and Meaning ) 
(Hong Kong: ⅑᮷ॆ [Subculture Limited], 2013), pp. 37–44.
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